I summarise Robert Audi's 'Moral Perception.' I concede that there is such a thing as moral perception. However, moral perceptions are culturally-relative, which refutes Audi’s claims that moral perception may ground moral knowledge and that it provides inter-subjectively accessible grounds which make ethical objectivity possible. Audi's attempt to avoid the refutation tends to convert rational disputes into ad hominem ones. I illustrate that with the example of the ethics of prostitution.

Ethical intuitionists regard moral knowledge as deriving from moral intuition, moral observation, moral emotion and inference. However, moral intuitions, observations and emotions are cultural artefacts which often differ starkly between cultures. Intuitionists attribute uncongenial moral intuitions, observations or emotions to bias or to intellectual or moral failings; but that leads to sectarian ad hominen attacks. Intuitionists try to avoid that by restricting epistemically genuine intuitions, observations or emotions to those which are widely agreed. That does not avoid the problem. It (...) also limits epistemically genuine intuitions, observations or emotions to those with meagre content, and the intuitionists offer no plausible explanation for how inference from such insubstantial propositions can engender substantial moral knowledge. Instead of moral knowledge, intuitionism offers the prospect of mutual name-calling between intellectually stagnant groups. I criticise and reject the principle of phenomenal conservatism, to which intuitionists sometimes appeal. (shrink)

I reply to Mark Friedman's response to my review of his book, 'Nozick's Libertarian Project.' I restate what I take to be the key mistakes in Friedman’s arguments for individual rights and the minimal state. I outline the explanation of the right to freedom in terms of the human capacity for critical rationality, and the explanation of the poliitcial authority of the state in rule-consequentialist terms which do not appeal to consent.

In a series of articles specifically commossioned for this volume, some of today's most distinguished business ethicists survey the main areas of interest and ...

I. The soul & its faculties.--II. The world, the soul, and God.

Originally published in 1932, this book presents the substance of the Tanner Lectures for 1931–2, which were delivered by the British philosopher and theologian F. R. Tennant at Cambridge University. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in the philosophy of science and the relationships between academic disciplines.

Originally published in 1932, this book presents the substance of the Tanner Lectures for 1931–2, which were delivered by the British philosopher and theologian F. R. Tennant at Cambridge University. This book will be of value to anyone with an interest in the philosophy of science and the relationships between academic disciplines.

This chapter contains sections titled: Cultural relativism Ethical absolutism A cognitive alternative to EA: ethical relativism External and internal objections to ER Finding the middle ground: pluralistic relativism Ethics in business Conclusion.

Can a corporation have a conscience? What is wrong with reverse discrimination? Can ethical management and managed care coexist? Hoffman, Frederick, and Schwartz address these and many other current, intriguing, often complex issues in corporate morality. This introductory business ethics text contains a thorough general introduction on ethical theory, 54 readings, and 25 cases. Divided into five parts, each with an introduction that presents the major themes of its articles and cases, the text contains an impartial, point-counterpoint presentation of (...) different perspectives on the most important issues being debated in business ethics. Each chapter ends with questions that can be used for student discussion, review, tests/quizzes, or for student assignments. The fourth edition has 27 new readings, 15 new cases, and 10 new mini-cases. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION TO THE ARGUMENT OF 1768 Some ordinary facts about the world we live in can be readily explained by other ordinary facts. One can, for example, explain the fact that when we are facing north the sun rises on the right and ...

In this paper we consider the possibility of a Quantum Molinism : such a view applies an analogue of the Molinistic account of free will‘s compatibility with God’s foreknowledge to God’s knowledge of (supposedly) indeterministic events at a quantum level. W e ask how (and why) a providential God could care for and know about a world with this kind of indeterminacy. We consider various formulations of such a Quantum Molinism, and after rejecting a number of options arrive at one (...) seemingly coherent formulation. (shrink)

In both the Principles and the Dialogues Berkeley argues that physical objects cannot exist independently of minds. In this paper I suggest an interpretation of the argument in the Dialogues that shows that his argument either relies on an invalid inference or begs the question. I conclude that his attempt to defeat scepticism by making physical objects mind-dependent is unsuccessful.

In both the Principles and the Dialogues Berkeley argues that physical objects cannot exist independently of minds. In this paper I suggest an interpretation of the argument in the Dialogues that shows that his argument either relies on an invalid inference or begs the question. I conclude that his attempt to defeat scepticism by making physical objects mind-dependent is unsuccessful.

In this paper we consider whether one type of individual investor, which we call at risk investors, should be denied access to securities markets to prevent them from suffering serious financial harm. We consider one kind of paternalistic justification for prohibiting at risk investors from participating in securities markets, and argue that it is not successful. We then argue that restricting access to markets is justified in some circumstances to protect the rights of at risk investors. We conclude with some (...) suggestions about how this might be done. (shrink)

Examines the ways in which people made sense of religious conversion during the 12th century, a critical point in the formation of Western moral values. The book also indicates that the understanding of conversions, rooted in medieval love of indirect and intricate allegorical symbolism, entered the permanent legacy of Western literature and art. The idea of conversion became a mythic strategy of survival in conflict against the world, the flesh and the devil. This book holds that the idea of conversion (...) was a study in aesthetics, specifically in a male aesthetic, combining the brotherhood that violence engendered among warriors with the inexplicable genius of the poet. It explores the ascetic discipline, social myth, and representational art as components in a vast, militantly aggressive education system that served as context defining in the conversion process. (shrink)

Interpreting three conversion accounts, Morrison accents the categorical difference between the experience of conversion and written narratives about it. He explains why experience and text can only be related to each other in fictive ways.

This paper is the first phase of a longitudinal study of the class of 2014 on the effectiveness of ethics education at a business university. This phase of the project establishes the baseline attributes of incoming college freshmen with a pretest of the students’ ethical proclivity as measured by Defining Issues Test (DIT-2) scores. The relationship between the students’ ethical reasoning and their behavior in experimental stock trading sessions is then examined. In the trading simulations, randomly selected students were provided (...) with the option of receiving privileged insider information about the final payoff of several stocks. The students could either accept or reject such information, with acceptance considered illegal insider trading. The results of the pretest indicate that moral reasoning as measured by the DIT-2 is related to insider trading behavior, with students with higher DIT-2 scores being less likely to accept insider information. The paper also presents demographic differences across DIT-2 scores and trading behavior as a foundation for the longitudinal examination of changes in students’ moral cognition characteristics and behavior during their undergraduate career. (shrink)

An examination of determinism in the context of chaotic dynamics.